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Resumen
La antigua Atenas desarrolló la democracia a un nivel superior que 
cualquier otro Estado antes de los tiempos modernos. Fue la principal innovadora 
cultural de la época clásica. La Atenas clásica es justamente alabada por esos logros 
políticos y culturales. Menos bien conocido es el extraordinario logro en éxito militar 
de este Estado. Atenas fue directamente responsable por la transformación de las 
guerras griegas y por elevar diez veces su escala. Hacia los años 450 había emergido 
como la superpotencia del Mediterráno oriental. La primera razón mayor de esta 
elevación fue la ventaja demográ3ca del Estado. Con veinte veces más ciudadanos que 
un Estado griego promedio, Atenas podía poner ejércitos en campaña y 6otas que eran 
mucho más grandes que todos los demás, salvo unos pocos. La segunda razón mayor 
fue la inmensa renta que Atenas obtuvo de su imperio. Esto permitía emplear miles 
de ciudadanos no de la élite en campañas y perfeccionar nuevos cuerpos y modos de 
combate. Hay un argumento sólido para sostener que el gobierno democrático era 
la tercera razón mayor. El impacto militar de la democracia ateniense fue doble. La 
competencia de actores de élite ante jueces no de la élite resultó en una cultura pro-
guerra. Esta cultura alentó a los atenienses en números siempre crecientes a unirse a 
las fuerzas armadas y a votar por la guerra. Todo esto fue equilibrado por rigurosos 
debates acerca de la guerra en la democracia ateniense. El debate redujo los riesgos 
de un militarismo cultural ateniense. También facilitó las reformas y desarrolló la 
iniciativa de generales del Estado, hoplitas y marinos. Los cientistas políticos han 
mirado mucho tiempo la democracia ateniense como una fuente de ideas frescas. 
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Pero actualmente no pueden explicar satisfactoriamente el proceso de ir a la guerra 
de las modernas democracias. En consecuencia, la Historia Antigua puede proveer 
a la ciencia política con nuevas líneas de investigación acerca de cómo la moderna 
democracia impacta en las relaciones internacionales.
Palabras clave: Guerra - Democracia - Atenas antigua - Relaciones 
internacionales
Abstract
Ancient Athens developed democracy to a higher level than any other 
state before modern times. It was the leading cultural innovator of the classical age. 
Classical Athens is rightly revered for these political and cultural achievements. 
Less well known is this state’s extraordinary record of military success. Athens was 
directly responsible for transforming Greek wars and for raising their scale tenfold. 
By the 450s it had emerged as the eastern Mediterranean’s superpower. 8e 3rst 
major reason for this emergence was this state’s demographic advantage. With 
twenty times more citizens than an average Greek state Athens could 3eld armies 
and 6eets that were much larger than all but a few others. 8e second major reason 
was the immense income that Athens got from its empire. 8is allowed it to employ 
thousands of non-elite citizens on campaigns and to perfect new corps and combat 
modes. 8ere is a strong case that democratic government was the third major reason. 
8e military impact of Athenian democracy was twofold. 8e competition of elite 
performers before non-elite adjudicators resulted in a pro-war culture. 8is culture 
encouraged Athenians in ever-increasing numbers to join the armed forces and to 
vote for war. All this was o9set by Athenian democracy’s rigorous debates about war. 
8is debating reduced the risks of Athenian cultural militarism. It also made military 
reforms easier and developed the initiative of the state’s generals, hoplites and sailors. 
Political scientists have long viewed Athenian democracy as a source of fresh ideas. 
Presently they cannot satisfactorily explain the war-making of modern democracies. 
Consequently ancient history can provide political science with new lines of enquiry 
into how modern democracy impacts on international relations. 
Key words: War - Democracy - Ancient Athens - International Relations
69
Democratic War-Making in Ancient Athens David M. Pritchard
Democratic War-Making in 
Ancient Athens
 
David M. Pritchard
1. !e Democratic Revolution
A
ncient Athens is famous for its direct democracy and for 
its cultural revolution that helped to lay foundations for the 
literatures and the arts of the ancient and modern worlds. 
In 508 BC the Athenian dēmos (‘people’) rose up against a leader 
aiming for tyranny and expelled him and the foreign troops backing 
his attempt ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 20.1-21.2; Hdt. 5.65.5-74.1). 8ey had 
had enough of the bloody struggles of their elite and demanded an 
active role in the decision-making of their state (Pritchard, 2005, pp. 
141-5). 8is popular demand was quickly realised by the reforms of 
Cleisthenes ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 20-1; Hdt. 5.63-73). His reforms made the 
assembly and a new popular council the 3nal arbiters of public actions 
and laws. By the 450s the people had consolidated their dēmokratia 
(‘democracy’) by making decisions on an increasing range of public 
a9airs and by taking over entirely the administration of justice and the 
oversight of magistrates (Pritchard, 1994, pp. 133-5). 
Today we know that several other Greek poleis (‘city-states’) 
experimented with popular government in the course of the sixth 
century (Robinson, 1997, pp. 65-122). 8erefore the invention of 
democracy can no longer be attributed to Athens. But Athenian 
democracy was di9erent in that it avoided the stasis (‘civil strife’) that 
disrupted so many other Greek democracies (Hansen and Nielsen, 
2004, p. 124) With the exception of two short periods of oligarchy it 
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enjoyed two centuries of unbroken operation. With incessant wars 
and an empire to administer Athenian democracy also had a lot more 
public business (Pritchard, 2010, p. 58). 8is state’s stronger 3scal 
position allowed it to employ thousands of Athenians to conduct 
this business (Pritchard, 2015b, 7-6) In the 420s, for example, their 
misthos (‘pay’), along with clerical assistance, added up to 150 talents 
(‘t’) per year (Pritchard, 2015b, pp. 62-90). 8is subsidisation of the 
poor’s participation in politics was, apparently, innovative, because 
no evidence for it exists elsewhere until the fourth century (Rhodes, 
1981, p. 339). It ensured that a much wider social spectrum could be 
politically engaged (e.g. Arist. Pol. 1293a1–10). 8e result of these 
di9erences was that Athenian democracy was more fully developed 
than any other pre-modern example. 
2. !e Cultural Revolution
Athens was also the leading cultural centre of the classical Greek 
world. 8e disciplines of the visual arts, oratory, drama and literature 
were developed to a higher level of sophistication in this state than any 
other. Many of the works produced there become canonical for Graeco-
Roman antiquity. Ever since Joachim Winckelmann – the eighteenth-
century pioneer of Classical Archaeology – scholars have attributed 
this cultural revolution to the democracy (Pritchard, 2010, pp. 4-5). 
8e famous plays of ancient Athens are a good example. 8ey may have 
been written by elite playwrights. But they were performed at contests 
before thousands of non-elite theatregoers. OXcially the judging of 
these contests was in the hands of 10 judges (Pritchard, 2012, pp. 16-
17). But these judges were swayed by the vocal reactions of non-elite 
theatregoers (e.g. Dem. 18.265; 19.33; 21.226; Pl. Leg. 659a). By going 
to the theatre regularly the dēmos gained an excellent grasp of drama 
(Revermann, 2006). Consequently playwrights had a better chance of 
winning if they pushed the boundaries of their genres. 
3. !e Military Revolution
Athens is rightly revered for such achievements; by contrast, its 
contemporaneous military revolution is not widely recognised. More 
than any other polis this state invented or perfected new forms of 
combat, strategy and military organisation. It was directly responsible 
for raising the scale of Greek warfare by an order of magnitude. In 
so doing the Athenian dēmos overcame the traditional conception 
of courage that elsewhere tended to sti6e military innovations. 8is 
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represented a qualitative change from its military record before 
Athenian democracy (Pritchard, 2010, pp. 7-15). Sixth-century 
Athenians went to war infrequently and typically only for the sake of 
contested border lands. 8eir campaigns went for days or weeks and 
were settled by a solitary clash of hoplites. 8ey were initiated not by 
the basic political institutions of the city but by leaders of aristocratic 
factions. 8ese leaders raised volunteers by promising them the land 
that might be won in battle (e.g. Plut. Vit. Sol. 9.2-3). 8e hoplites of 
such campaigns were predominantly upper class and numbered only 
in the hundreds (Singor, 2009). 
8is small-scale war-making was initially transformed by the political 
reforms that Cleisthenes introduced immediately aYer 508. 8ese 
reforms massively increased the readiness of non-elite Athenians to 
serve as soldiers and sailors and to start wars. In 506 their army defeated 
those of Chalcis and Boeotia in back-to-back battles (Hdt. 5.74-7), in 
499 they sent 20 warships to help the Anatolian Greeks to revolt from 
the Persian empire (97-103), and, in 490, at Marathon they deployed 
9000 hoplites (Nep. Milt. 5). 8ese reforms e9ectively integrated 
Athens and its khōra (‘countryside’) for the 3rst time (Pritchard, 2005, 
pp. 137-40). Each free male of Attica was now registered as a citizen 
of Athens in his village and groups of them from across the khōra 
were linked together in 10 tribes (Rhodes, 2014, pp. 44-5). 8ese new 
tribes served as the subdivisions of the new popular council and a new 
publicly controlled army of hoplites. 8ese registers of citizens were 
used to conscript hoplites (Crowley, 2012, pp. 27-35). 8is was the 
Athenian state’s 3rst-ever mechanism for mass mobilisation. Because 
Athens had around 20 times more citizens than the average-sized polis 
(Hansen and Nielsen, 2004, pp. 70-3), this mechanism gave Athens a 
huge military advantage. Demography would be one of the three major 
reasons of 3Yh-century Athens’s military revolution. 
In the late 480s and the early 470s interrelated events set in train 
a second phase of Athenian military innovation. To ready for the 
return of the Persians, the Athenian people decided, in 483, to direct a 
windfall of public income from local silver mines towards the massive 
expansion of their new publicly controlled navy ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.7; 
Hdt. 6.87-93, 7.144; 8uc. 1.14). 8e 200 warships that they possessed 
at the end of this shipbuilding represented the largest 6eet of polis-
owned warships yet seen (Pritchard, 2015a, p. 144). 8ree years later 
the Great King launched his expedition to subjugate the Greeks of 
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the mainland as he had recently done to those of Anatolia and the 
Dardanelles (Rhodes, 2014, pp. 58-62). 
8e 3nal destruction of this huge Persian force, in 479, saw the 
Athenians invited to found the Delian League. Initially this league was 
a voluntary alliance of states contributing ships and soldiers or annual 
tribute to Athenian-led expeditions (8uc. 1.94-8). For its 3rst decades 
the league campaigned frequently to expel Persians from remaining 
strong points across the Aegean. At the same time the Athenians began 
eroding the independence of their allies, who, by the early 440s, were 
obliged to pay tribute and had long been forcefully prevented from 
pulling out of what was now the Athenian arkhē or Empire. 
Imperial revenues allowed Athens to employ huge numbers of 
non-elite citizens as soldiers and sailors, and to perfect forms of 
warfare that broke decisively from the hoplite-based conception of 
courage (Pritchard, 2010, pp. 15-21). Among numerous innovations, 
they were now able to launch large 6eets and to train their crews for 
months (e.g. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.19-20; 8uc. 1.80, 142.6-7; 2.84-6, 89). 
Each trained crew could collectively work to make their warship an 
o9ensive weapon in its own right and to take part in manoeuvres 
at speed with other ships. In this new form of mobile sea warfare 
a standard tactic was retreat (e.g. 8uc. 2.91.1-92.2). Retreat was a 
source of shame among hoplites (e.g. Aesch. Sept. 10-20; Ar. Vesp. 
1114-21; Eur. Heracl. 700-1). 
By the 450s war had come to dominate the public a9airs of Athens 
and the private lives of its citizens (Pritchard, 2015a, pp. 145-6). 8e 
dēmos now saw soldiering as the duty of every citizen (e.g. Aesch. 
Sept. 10-20; Ar. Vesp. 1114-21; Eur. Heracl. 824-7). In addition they 
waged war more frequently than ever before, doing so on average in 
two out of three years (Pritchard, 2010, p. 6). 8ey also directed more 
public money to war than to all other public business. In the 420s 
public spending alone on the armed forces was 1500 t. on average per 
year (Pritchard, 2015b, pp. 92-9). 8e unprecedented supply of public 
income from the Athenian Empire was clearly a second major reason 
for the Athenian military revolution. 
4. Challenging Realism and Popular Beliefs
A striking feature of classical Athenian history is the timing of this 
military revolution (Pritchard, 2010, pp. 27-8). 8e transformation 
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of war by the Athenians directly follows the democratic revolution of 
508. It coincides with the cultural revolution that was largely brought 
about by Athenian democracy. 8e near contemporaneity of these three 
revolutions opens up a challenging possibility: the Athenian military 
revolution may be another product of Athenian democracy. It may be the 
dark side of the Athenian cultural revolution. Consequently democracy 
may be the third major reason for the military success of 3Yh-century 
Athens. Among classical-period writers the perception of democracy’s 
positive impact was more widespread than is usually assumed (e.g. Isoc. 
16.27; Dem. 60.25-6). Herodotus for one attributed the unexpected 
double victories of 506 to Athens’s new democracy (5.78-9).
8is historical example of a militarily successful democracy 
challenges the realist school that has dominated international relations 
since the Second World War. 8is school’s antecedents go back to 
8omas Hobbes’s translation of 8ucydides (de Sainte Croix, 1972, pp. 
26-9). Proponents of this school assume that every state, regardless of 
what political regime it has, rationally calculates foreign policy on the 
basis of what will maximise security and prosperity. In addition classical 
Athens confounds two popular beliefs about democracy (Reiter and 
Stam, 2002, pp. 2-3, 146-7, 150). 8e 3rst belief is that democracies 
are bad at prosecuting wars. 8is assumes that democratic freedom 
undercuts military discipline, while the fear that democratic leaders 
have of voters means that the tough necessary policies for security are 
not always introduced. 8is example of democratic bellicosity also 
challenges the cherished view of our postwar era that democracies are 
peace-seeking. According to this belief, democracies shun violence in 
foreign a9airs, prefer non-violent forms of con6ict resolution and only 
reluctantly 3ght wars. 
8ese popular beliefs and realism’s in6uence beyond political 
science explain why democracy’s impact on war has hardly ever been 
studied (Merom, 2003, pp. 3-18). Ancient historians have not been 
an exception: most of our studies have focussed narrowly on the 
organisation of one or another corps of the Athenian armed forces or 
on the general contribution of one or another type of soldier to Greek 
warfare. Victor Hanson writes (2007, p. 19): ‘OYen the parameters of 
present investigations simply re6ect old controversies of the nineteenth 
century, while fruitful new 3elds of enquiry are leY unexamined. For 
example, there are dozens of new treatments of traditionally narrow 
topics such as the hoplite push or the battle of Marathon, while we still 
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have no wider enquiry into the role of ancient political organization – 
oligarchy, democracy and autocracy – on military eXcacy.’ 
5. Democratic Peace and War !eories
In the last two decades some international-relations theorists have 
also broken from the realist school by focusing on di9erences between 
the war-making of modern democracies and other regime-types. From 
their statistical analyses – which have been rigorously debated and 
repeatedly tested – they have made three important 3ndings. Firstly, 
Bruce Russett, among others, has put beyond doubt that democracies 
do not 3ght each other (e.g. Russett and Oneal 2001). But this does 
not mean that they do not 3ght wars; for the second 3nding is that 
democratic regimes are no less warlike than autocracies. 8ey have 
frequently fought colonial wars or attacked non-democratic states 
in the name, for example, of democracy and human rights (e.g. 
Ferejohn and Rosenbluth 2008). 8e third 3nding of these theorists 
is the general superiority of democracies at waging wars. Drawing on 
the US Army’s database of modern wars, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam 
have demonstrated statistically that democracies have enjoyed greater 
military success than other regime-types (Reiter and Stam, 2002, pp. 
11-57). 8ey have won over 90 percent of the wars that they have 
started and around 80 percent of the wars that they have fought. 
‘Although this research’, Wolfgang Merkel writes (2009, p. 31), ‘uses 
sophisticated statistical methods, it oYen relies on a rudimentary 
understanding of democracy and the interdependent workings of 
democratic institutions. While these researchers specialize in questions 
of war and peace, they are hardly democracy scholars. Missing is the 
intertwining of comparative politics and international relations expertise’. 
Consequently it is no surprise that every attempt on the part of these 
theorists to explain these important 3ndings has not withstood scrutiny 
(Müller and Wol9, 2006; Robinson, 2010, pp. 288-98). A good example is 
the cultural explanation why democracies do not attack each other, which 
accounts for the so-called democratic peace in terms of the preferences of 
voters (e.g. Maoz and Russett 1993). As they abhor violence, it is argued, 
and respect human rights, including those of potential enemies, they 
demand that their politicians resolve international disputes peacefully. 
But this leaves unexplained why democracies 3ght autocratic regimes; 
for, if their voters prefer peace, they should shy away from all wars, not 
just those against other democracies.
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6. !eorising Ancient Democratic War
In order to develop a theory of Athenian democracy’s impact on 
war I invited classical-studies scholars and political scientists to an 
edited volume that Cambridge University Press published as War, 
Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens. Together our chapters 
suggest that this democracy’s military impact was twofold. 8e 
competition of elite performers in front of non-elite adjudicators 
created a pro-war culture. 8is encouraged the Athenians to join the 
armed forces in ever-increasing numbers and to vote regularly for 
war. But this was o9set by Athenian democracy’s rigorous debating 
of war. 8is reduced this cultural militarism’s risks and encouraged 
military reforms. It also helped to develop the initiative of the state’s 
generals, hoplites and sailors. 
Non-elite Athenians understandably had a positive view of their own 
military service as hoplites and sailors. As a consequence they showed 
preference for those public speakers and playwrights who employed 
epic poetry’s depiction of soldiering to describe their own military 
service (Pritchard, 2010, 36-9). 8is depiction had been the preserve of 
the elite before Athenian democracy (Balot, 2014, pp. 179-80, 198-203; 
Pritchard, 2013, pp. 198-200). Because poor Athenians continued to 
be ashamed of their poverty (e.g. Ar. Plut. 218-21; Lys. 24.16-17), this 
extension of the traditional conception of aretē (‘courage’) down the 
social scale made soldiering attractive to them as a source of esteem. 
But this recognition of courage among non-elite soldiers proved to 
be a double-edged sword: while making them feel proud, it put them 
under social pressure to participate in, and to vote for, wars (Pritchard, 
2010, pp. 37-9). For the Greeks aretē had to be regularly proven by 
actions, while those who saw themselves as courageous felt aiskhunē 
(‘shame’) to be accused of cowardice. Athenians could be so accused 
not only if they retreated from a battle but also if they failed to endorse 
a war that appeared to be necessary (e.g. Eur. Heracl. 700-1; Phoen. 
999-1005; Suppl. 314-23). 8e result was that Athenian politicians 
exploited the fear of shame among assembly-goers to build support for 
their bellicose proposals, even if it risked pressuring them into wars 
that they could not possibly win (e.g. Aeschin. 2.137-8; 8uc. 6.13.1). 
Certainly the democracy’s open debating of foreign policy did 
not a9ect the bellicosity of the dēmos. But it did normally reduce 
the risk that they would endorse poorly conceived proposals for war 
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(Pritchard, 2010, pp. 47-51). Politicians were free to be contentious 
and their rivalries with each other guaranteed that proposals for war 
met with opposing arguments (e.g. 8uc. 1.139; 3.36-50). 8e constant 
adjudicating of such debates by non-elite Athenians improved the 
quality of their decision-making on foreign a9airs. It made them 
more innovative and more 6exible than the combatants of oligarchies 
and autocracies. It allowed them to see the merits of innovations that 
confounded the traditional conception of courage. 
War, Democracy and Culture in Classical Athens probably puts 
beyond doubt that the third major reason for 3Yh-century Athens’s 
military revolution was democracy. But this still leaves an ambiguity: 
we do not know how important democratic government was relative to 
the other two major reasons: namely, the huge demographic advantage 
that 3Yh-century Athens had and the unprecedented public income 
that it got from its empire. Here the military record of fourth-century 
Athens proves to be decisive (Pritchard, 2010, pp. 51-5). AYer 405 the 
Athenian citizen-body was only ever half the size that it had reached 
in the 3Yh century. Postwar Athens no longer bene3tted from imperial 
income. 8e traditional argument was that these losses caused a huge 
decline in Athenian war-making (e.g. Mossé, 1962, pp. 315-22). It was 
long argued that the fourth-century dēmos waged fewer wars and were 
reluctant to serve in them. Consequently foreign mercenaries had to 
be used in ever-increasing numbers. 8ey soon became the core of the 
Athenian armed forces. Without tribute Athens supposedly could not 
keep enough ships at sea to make itself safe. In making this argument 
French historians especially believed what Demosthenes had said in 
the 340s about Athenian wars. As part of his attempt to convince the 
dēmos to 3ght Macedonia Demosthenes made out that their soldiering 
failed to match the high standard that their 3Yh-century forebears had 
set (e.g. Dem. 1-4, 6, 8-9). 
In the 1980s some military historians began to re-assess the wars 
of fourth-century Athens (e.g. Harding, 1988). 8is re-assessment 
completely disproves the traditional argument. It also corroborates the 
doubts that some always had about the reliability of Demosthenes as 
witness to military history. In the fourth century the dēmos actually 
initiated wars more oYen than it had before: they campaigned non-stop 
from 396 to 386 and then from 378 to 338 with only one-year periods 
of peace (Pritchard, 2010, p. 53). Leonhardt Burckhardt especially 
shows that ‘mercenaries were only an important supplement’ (1995, 
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p. 128). Certainly such soldiers were used as light-armed specialists 
and as permanent garrisons. But the backbone of Athens’s armed 
forces remained its citizens (Burckhardt, 1995, pp. 118-20). Athenians 
still regularly fought pitched battles in which their soldiering secured 
victory (e.g. Xen. Hell. 3.5.18-22; 4.2.16-23, 3.15-20). Large numbers 
of them continued voluntarily to serve in the navy (e.g. [Dem.] 50.29; 
Xen. Hell. 5.4.61). 
Indeed postwar Athens still ruled the waves: it launched the 6eets 
that were required to protect its shipping-lines (e.g. Dem. 18.301-2; 
[Dem.] 50.4-6; Xen. Hell. 5.4.61), and, was again widely recognised 
as Greece’s leading seapower (e.g. Dem. 6.12; 8.45; Diod. Sic. 15.78.4; 
Xen. Hell. 7.1.1). In order to pay for this warmaking Athens introduced 
a whole series of 3nancial innovations (Pritchard, 2015b, pp. 102-
3). In the 370s and the 360s it could therefore spend on average 500 
talents per year on its armed forces (Pritchard, 2015b, pp. 102-3). 8is 
spending enabled Athens to become a major regional power and to 
keep its enemies outside Attica until the 320s (Harding, 1995, pp. 119-
25). Athens achieved all this in spite of its much smaller population 
and its lack of imperial income. 8is renewed military success strongly 
suggests that the most important major reason for 3Yh-century 
Athens’s military revolution was democracy.  
7. !e Usefulness of Ancient History for Political Science
Presently political scientists are unable to account for the warmaking 
of contemporary democracies. Here there is great potential for history 
to advance our understanding of this issue (Pritchard, 2015a, p. 151). 
8e records of past democracies can expose questionable assumptions 
about the interaction of democracy and war today. More importantly 
an explanation of a past democracy’s military impact can furnish new 
ideas for thinking about contemporary ones. In this respect ancient 
Athens would appear to be of real value. 
Yet there are, of course, di9erences between this state’s dēmokratia 
and modern democracies (Robinson, 1997, pp. 13-16, 25-33). 8e 
3rst major di9erence is that Athenian democracy was direct. Final 
decisions about all public business were made by a sovereign assembly. 
8is assembly met 40 times per year (Pritchard, 2015b,pp. 62-3). In 
it 20 percent of Athenians always participated (Pritchard, 2015a, p. 
152). In this direct democracy ordinary citizens directly voted on 
individual policies. In modern democracies this is not possible. Athens 
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may have been one of the ancient Greek world’s largest states. But it 
was tiny by modern standards. Nation-states are larger by an order 
of magnitude or more. 8e result is that modern democracies cannot 
organise nation-wide assemblies for their citizens. Instead they ask 
them to elect politicians to represent them in parliaments. In modern 
elections participation may be much higher than 20 per cent. Modern 
politicians usually implement the policy platforms on which they were 
elected. But elections are still only held every two or three years. On 
the issue of voting frequency, therefore, modern democracies are less 
democratic than the Athenian one. 
Ancient Athens was also innovative in its extension of political 
rights to all non-elite free males. Many other Greek states only gave 
political rights to those who met a high property-quali3cation. But the 
Athenians never enfranchised their female relatives (Pritchard, 2014, 
pp. 184, 188). 8ey owned slaves who did not have any political and legal 
rights. 8is is the second major di9erence between their democracy 
and ours. Modern democracies outlawed slavery in the nineteenth 
century. By the 1960s all had extended the right to vote to females, 
indigenous peoples and other subaltern groups. On the issue of voting 
rights, then, the situation is reversed: contemporary democracies are 
more democratic than Athenian democracy. 
8ese di9erences complicate the comparison of ancient and 
modern democracies. Certainly they make it impossible to project 
conclusions about classical Athens directly onto the modern world. In 
spite of this, direct and representative democracies still have a lot in 
common (Hansen 1989). Each gives political rights to as many people 
as social norms allow. Both give voters equal opportunities to elect 
or to be politicians, and promote freedom of speech and the rule of 
law. In addition both democratic regime-types encourage politicians 
to develop competing policy-proposals. In both the votes of the 
people play a vital role in deciding which proposals will be enacted. 
Consequently there is enough common ground meaningfully to 
compare ancient and modern democracies. 8erefore 3ndings about 
classical Athens can probably be used to enrich our understanding of 
modern democracies. 
Classicists and ancient historians do not fully recognise this 
potential, because we generally do not pay attention to hot topics in 
international relations (Robinson, 2010, 278). 8is stands in contrast 
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to the ever-increasing numbers of political scientists who draw on 
ancient Athens. For example, theorists of comparative politics use 
ancient Athenian dēmokratia as a point of comparison for identifying 
unique features of modern democracies (e.g. Carson and Martin, 
1999), while economists are turning to it to test their theories (e.g. 
Tridimas 2017). Some of those in international relations who have 
abandoned the realist school have also recognised the ancient Greek 
world as ‘the only other well documented state system with a larger 
number of democratic regimes’ (Russett and Antholis, 1992, p. 415). 
Consequently they draw on Athenian war-making in support of their 
own theories about why modern democracies do not 3ght one another 
or do better militarily than autocracies (e.g. Russett 2009, pp. 9-36) 
8is use of ancient history by international-relations theorists makes 
clear that they remain receptive to ongoing research into the foreign 
a9airs of Athenian democracy. In conclusion ancient democratic 
Athens can help political scientists to build a new empirical theory on 
modern democracies at war. 
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